



Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the  
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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March 29, 2005

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Mr. President,

You asked this Commission to advise you on the adequacy of plans produced in response to your memoranda to the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence dated November 18, 2004. This letter conveys our views. In brief, we do not believe that either response is entirely adequate, and both responses show that these agencies remain too comfortable with a “business as usual” approach to intelligence gathering. They show, in short, just how important—and how difficult—Ambassador Negroponte’s job will be.

(In a separate Memorandum, you sought the advice of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on paramilitary operations and invited our comments on their report. This report was due in mid-February but has not yet been submitted; we plan to provide comments when we receive it.)

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

Your memorandum to the Attorney General approved and called for implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation establish “a specialized and integrated national security workforce.” You specifically directed the FBI to “allocate sufficient resources and authority to the new Intelligence Directorate to perform its assigned mission” and take other measures to improve intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. You asked the Bureau to produce “a comprehensive plan with performance measures” for achieving measurable progress.

The FBI responded on February 16, 2005, with a *Comprehensive Plan for the FBI Intelligence Program with Performance Measures* (the “FBI Plan”). To all outward appearances, the FBI Plan is what you asked for. It contains a detailed account of all